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This chapter examines the Baltic states’ efforts to frame and interpret communist-era 
crimes through the lens of three European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decisions. The 
cases were driven by petitions from citizens from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania who, after 
1991, failed to get redress in domestic courts on issues related to communist-era actions and 
offenses. The verdicts in themselves are documents that reflect a certain understanding of the 
history of the region. In other words, both the decisions and the ways in which communist-
era actions are characterized as actionable crimes according to domestic and international law 
constitute important practices of transitional justice. 
This chapter considers three salient narratives about the communist past: first, the 
narratives put forth by the Baltic states themselves in which they interpret certain Soviet-era 
actions as crimes perpetrated by the KGB on the occupied Baltic states; second, the narratives 
put forward by the defendants in domestic and European courts regarding actionable crimes 
and who holds responsibility for them; and third, the narratives set out by ECtHR judges in 
both the verdicts and their dissenting opinions regarding these Soviet-era offenses. All of 
these narratives and interpretations are important transitional justice documents. This chapter 
focuses on three ECtHR decisions, and the way they reflect the understanding of past crimes 
shared by the judges, the prosecutors, and the defense counsels. These external actors label 
certain actions as crimes (including imprescriptible crimes) and by so doing, they change or 
consolidate the historical narrative in the country from which the case originated. 
In particular, this chapter argues that these court cases illustrate areas in which 
domestic and international actors contest memory. They demonstrate that the ECtHR judges 
can have a wide variety of opinions on whether acts perpetrated during Soviet times on the 
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territory of the three Baltic states are punishable after 1991. The ECtHR judges come from 
diverse educational and legal cultural backgrounds, with potential implications on their 
understanding of 20
th
 century European history. The ECtHR is increasingly playing an 
important role in the validation of key historical narratives in post-communist Europe, with 
unexpected consequences for the definition of key crimes and the way these definitions are 
contested The judiciary’s legal interpretation and understanding of international human rights 
law is crucial in criminal justice cases that entail a conflict between the duty to prosecute 
heinous crimes and the prohibition of ex-post facto punishment.
2
 To illustrate the way that 
these changes in definition and legal remedy come about, the chapter engages both the legal 
reasoning put forward by domestic courts before the cases reach the ECtHR, and the legal 
reasoning and verdict of the ECtHR on these cases. 
At present, the ECtHR includes 47 judges nominated by the states parties to the 
European Convention of Human Rights. At least 22 judges come from former communist 
countries and the FSU, including one judge from Russia. A case that comes before the 
Chamber of the ECtHR is heard by a bench composed of the President of the Section to 
which the case is assigned, the national judge (the judge with the nationality of the state 
against which the application is lodged) and five other judges. In exceptional cases, a case 
may be referred or relinquished to the Grand Chamber. In such a situation, the bench is 
composed of a larger panel of 17 judges. 
In the Baltic republics in particular, and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) more 
generally, the transition from the repressive communist regimes to more democratic forms of 
government catalyzed new perspectives on national history. The power struggle between the 
old and new elites produced different narratives, some shared by the former oppressors, 
others championed by the former oppressed. The transition also created debates about the 
significance of key historical events and persons and, more broadly, about right and wrong. 
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In this context, the domestic courts have become critical forums in which different versions 
of the communist history have prevailed at times through the venue of legal cases. 
Occasionally, some of the cases related to communist crimes have then moved to 
international courts, when individuals believed that due process or legal safeguards were not 
met in their national jurisdiction. As a result, the ECtHR has become an important “dispenser 
of transitional justice.”
3
 The “narratives” about the communist past that the ECtHR has heard, 
produced, and accepted have in turn determined the shape, form and success of an important 
transitional justice measure: court trials as a method of redress. Interestingly, that redress 
consequently takes place at the national level, reflecting the manner in which the external 
framing of measures is nationally situated. While it does not replicate the type of foreign 
transitional justice seen in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), it does represent an important international influence on interpretations of history 
and justice. 
 Importantly, versions of history could also be appropriated for varied political ends.
4
 
In this chapter, ‘historical politics’ refers to the political use and abuse of history. An 
examination of the way in which memories of violent periods are interpreted and used reveals 
the active appropriation and the use of the past as a basis on which to take prosecutorial 
action.
5
 All cases considered here concerned retrospective justice, and required the courts to 
define and debate the communist crimes to see if they amounted to imprescriptible crimes 
(war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide). While retrospective justice is important 
for transitional justice, since it comprises the key points that underpin it (justice and truth), it 
is legally complex. The court can be challenged when asked to look at provisions permitting 
the law to work backwards to address egregious rights violations. The Baltic states illustrate 
the ways in which transitional justice, legal culture, historical politics, and retrospective 
justice can come together. Ultimately, these cases point to changes in the way international 
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courts interpret communist crimes as imprescriptible crimes. International courts can thus 
render rulings that impose a different view of history, in contradiction to the domestic courts’ 
interpretation. This chapter highlights the manner in which the ECtHR has shaped legal and 
political developments and historical narratives in the Baltic states. 
 
The Baltic states and their Soviet past  
Further to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Agreement concluded between the Soviets and the 
Germans, the Baltic states were militarily occupied and annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940. 
The states became part of the Soviet Union de facto, although most Western countries refused 
to recognize this annexation as legal.
6
 The Soviet occupying forces initiated, inter alia, two 
main repression campaigns in the Baltic states. 
During the first occupation of 1940-1941 the Soviets carried out mass deportations in 
all three countries. In Estonia, it is estimated that 9,267 persons were deported (the number 
does not include victims of repression or of extra-judicial executions). In Latvia 15,424 
persons were deported, and in Lithuania 17,500.
7
 Other forms of widespread repression 
extended to all segments of the Baltic populations, including the political and economic 
elites, and racial and religious minorities, such as Jews, Roma and Jehovah’s Witnesses. This 
first repression campaign is often seen as evidence of the Soviet Union’s intent to destroy 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
8
 
 During the first twelve years of the second occupation of 1944-1991 further 
deportations were carried out against local guerrilla movements (the so-called ‘forest 
brethren’), the wealthy peasants (the kulaks), and various religious minorities.
9
 It is estimated 
that 20,702 Estonians, 42,231 Latvians, and 78,735 Lithuanians were deported during this 
second wave.
10
 The number of casualties is perhaps even higher, but cannot be estimated in 
the absence of full access to Russian communist-era archives. Estimates of the total number 
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of Baltic inhabitants repressed, executed or deported to remote regions in the Soviet Union in 
1940-1953 range from several hundred thousand to over a million,
11
 and do not include the 
people executed or killed or the thousands who fled westwards upon the return of the Soviet 
Red Army in 1944.
12
 Archival materials suggest that these deportations were planned and 
executed by the local Soviet security services at the direct order of Moscow, but could not 
have taken place without high levels of cooperation on the part of the Estonians, Latvians and 
Lithuanians.
13
 The Baltic states condemned their incorporation into the Soviet Union as 
forcible military occupation, and asserted that these two deportation campaigns amounted to 
genocide by the Soviet occupying regime. It was not until the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 
that state responsibility for Soviet-era crimes became a tangible possibility. During the early 
1990s, Russia reached out to the Baltic states to establish joint history commissions. These 
early attempts were rejected by Estonia and petered out in Latvia, because the Baltic 
republics were not convinced that such commissions could lead to a meaningful outcome. 
Under Russian Presidents Dmitry Medvedev (2008-2012) and Vladimir Putin (1999-2008, 
2012-present) historical politics included the following: 
1) evasive dealings with Stalinism with infrequent critical utterances; 2) tactical 
‘willingness’ to acknowledge historical facts and responsibility (not always offering 
an apology) of the Soviets for such undeniable criminal actions…; 3) large-scale 
recreation and popular diffusion of the myth of the ‘Great Patriotic War’, especially 
the glorification and self-sacrificing and heroic contribution of the Soviets to the 
victory against fascism and the liberation of Europe; 4) thorough counteraction 
against the denial or distortion of ‘the results of the Second World War’ that were 
decided and confirmed at Yalta, Potsdam, Nuremberg and Tokyo.
14
  
In contrast to the narrative about the past that would comport with Russia’s version of the 
Baltics as willing Soviet Union republics, most people in the Baltic states experienced Soviet 
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rule as imposed from the outside. After 1991, the Baltic states pushed a dominant historical 
narrative that treated the Soviet occupation and the entire Soviet regime as an externally 
inflicted tragedy.
15
 By so doing, they ignored the large role played by ethnic Estonians, 
Latvians and Lithuanians in supporting the occupation, consolidating communist rule, and 
carrying out the surveillance program (see Bekus in this volume). The three court cases 
discussed in this chapter speak to these aspects of historical politics in post-communist 
Russia and the Baltics, highlighting the layered and complex history of the Baltics as part of, 
and oppressed by, the Soviet Union. Since 1991, the oppressed have been rehabilitated by the 
Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian states, but the Russian state has rejected both the criminal 
prosecution of Soviet or Russian offenders and its responsibility to compensate Baltic 
victims. Russia’s rejection of responsibility and compensation has prompted commentators to 
recall the eagerness with which Nikita Khrushchev condemned Stalinist crimes at the 20
th
 
Communist Party Congress in 1956, but not the other crimes perpetrated by the Soviet state 
after Stalin’s death in 1953.
16
 The selective manner in which some histories are repressed and 
other histories are validated highlights the potential instrumental use of the past to forge a 
new national narrative. These tensions are evident in the three ECtHR cases explored in depth 
in the following section. Court petitions and cases challenge narratives underscoring the 
Soviet heroism against fascism, and by doing so, in the eyes of the Russian officials, they 
distort World War II reality. In this way, the Baltic cases are not just about the Baltics, they 
reverberate through other FSU states, in particular Russia, as they legitimize or reject certain 
narratives about the past that are critical for state building. 
 
Retrospective justice through the Baltic court cases 
 
Measures supporting retrospective justice are an important subject of study. 
Retrospective justice ideally aims at ascertaining the truth and achieving justice, yet not all 
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truth and justice policies may automatically contribute to such a process, and the links 
between truth and justice are varied and require consideration.
17
 Retrospective justice has its 
roots in the old criminal law principle that the law should not work backwards. This principle 
was enshrined in Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
18
 The Convention 
was formulated in 1950, when its drafters responded to previous developments in Nazi 
Germany and other parts of Europe that allowed authoritarian regimes to pass retroactive 
laws that made criminal, without warning, acts that had been lawful under the previous 
democratic regime.
19
 These developments also resonated after World War II, when the 
international community developed the Nuremberg principles, further to the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal of 8 August 1945, which permitted individuals to be 
prosecuted for crimes against humanity that had not been criminal according to the Nazi 
legislation and practice in force at the time when those acts had been committed.
20
 In general, 
Article 7 prohibits the legislature and the courts from creating or extending the existing law 
to criminalize acts or omissions that were not illegal at the time of their commission or 
omission, or to increase a penalty retroactively. It also expects the law to be clearly defined.
21
 
Article 7 reads: 
No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission 
which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the 
time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that 
was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. This article shall not 
prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the 
time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations.
22
 
 Criminal law, which is based on individual guilt and is used to confront past injustice, 
has important retrospective justice components pertaining to legal certainty and clarity that 
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will be explored in this piece through court cases. As will become clear in the next section, 
both the requirement for individual culpability and the reservation that individuals shall not 
be punished retrospectively mean that certain forms of retrospective justice might sit uneasily 
with the legal guarantees enshrined in Article 7.  
The Nuremberg Trials drew the attention of the international legal community to 
principles of natural justice, which were eventually embraced by University of Heidelberg 
law professor Gustav Radbruch, after he rejected the idea that the horrendous acts of the 
Holocaust (and other crimes) could go unpunished because they were positive laws. Positive 
laws are laws laid down by statute by a properly instituted and recognized branch of 
government. To him, the principle of natural justice could be overcome if the contradiction 
between the laws in force and the need for justice reached an unbearable degree where the 
statute constituted incorrect law.
23
 Radbruch’s solution to this legal conundrum was readily 
embraced by the international legal community, and allowed for the prosecution of past 
crimes as a method of transitional justice. 
In the Baltic states, retrospective justice has been connected primarily with the crimes 
committed by the Soviet state and its agents. The use of retrospective justice through court 
cases demonstrates how certain historical narratives are validated, thereby privileging certain 
interpretations of the past in a region with layered histories of atrocity. In particular, three 
rulings handed down by the ECtHR directly engage with regional retrospective justice 
dilemmas: Kolk and Kislyiy v. Estonia (decision of 17 January 2006), Kononov v. Latvia 
(decision of 17 May 2010), and Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania (decision of 20 October 2015).
24
 
These three cases have been selected for this analysis based on key characteristics that lie at 
the core of legal arguments: the nature of the crime, the identity of the perpetrator(s) and of 
the victim(s), as well as the tensions between diverging historical narratives and retrospective 
justice goals that infringe procedural guarantees and human rights. 
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The crimes of concern for these cases were war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
genocide. Of special note is the definition and treatment of the crime of genocide. The 1948 
United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
defined that crime very narrowly.
25
 The Convention refers to protected national, ethnical, 
racial, and religious groups, but in one of the three Baltic cases examined in this chapter, the 
ECtHR was asked to extend the definition of genocide to include national political groups. 
The confirmation by the ECtHR of such an extension did not occur. The chapter examines 
the way crimes were defined and understood by the state prosecutor, defense counsel and the 
national courts, and whether the ECtHR upheld the state’s narrative in its rulings. Such an 
investigation is pertinent to transitional justice because it demonstrates that redress through 
the courts can validate or invalidate the official historical narrative of a country. 
 
Estonia 
The Estonian International Commission for the Investigation of Crimes against 
Humanity (EICICAH) was created in 1998.
26
 Its mandate was to establish the crimes against 
humanity that occurred in Estonia under the Nazi and Soviet occupation regimes (the German 
occupation of 1941-1944 and the Soviet occupation 1940-1941 and 1944 onward). Its remit 
included documentation, not prosecution. In its final report (published in 2008), the 
Commission used Article 7 of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, not 
the Nuremburg definition of 1945, to define crimes against humanity. While the actions may 
qualify as genocide under both documents, the choice to use the Rome Statute was justified 
on the grounds that the crimes researched by the EICICAH fell under the Rome Statute’s 
definitions of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. The decision to use the 
Rome Statute also avoided the heated debated about the Nuremberg definition requiring a 
nexus between the crime and war. Thus, the decision was a prudent one, since to tie the 
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definition to the Nuremberg principles might have potentially created problems for 
prosecutors seeking a charge of genocide. The EICICAH began its work in 1998, at the same 
time as the Commission of Historians in Latvia, and the International Commission for the 
Evaluation of the Crimes of Nazi and Soviet Occupation Regimes in Lithuania. All three 
transitional justice bodies used the Rome Statute to legitimate their aims.
27
 By relying on an 
international treaty, the Baltic states had the confidence to demand the re-evaluation of their 
historical narratives about World War II.
28
 
The 1992 Estonian Constitution established that the general principles and norms of 
international law were part of the country’s domestic law. Before the adoption of the new 
Criminal Code in 2001, amendments were made to the Soviet Criminal Code (which 
remained in force in post-communist Estonia) to include crimes against humanity and 
genocide. Neither crime was known in the Soviet Criminal Code, but after the amendments 
took force both crimes were included in paragraph 61.
29
 By putting the two concepts 
together, the resulting definition created confusion with respect to the applicable law. The 
new Criminal Code’s definition referred to the definitions of crimes against humanity and 
genocide in international law, but also went beyond them. For example, according to the new 
Code the corpus delicti, or requisite elements of the crime, included acts against social and 
political groups, defined as “anti-occupation resistance and other social groups.”
30
 This 
extension of the internationally accepted definition to include social and political groups was 
in direct reference to the repressive acts of deportation committed by the Soviet occupation 
forces in Estonia. Starting in 1996, the Estonian prosecutors initiated criminal proceedings 
against a number of persons involved in the mass deportation of civilians. In many 
investigations related to paragraph 61, most of the defendants had passed away, and in one 




The applicants in the case of Kolk and Kislyiy v. Estonia were of Estonian and 
Russian nationalities. Both were charged under paragraph 61 for their participation in the 
mass deportation of civilians from Estonia to remote areas of the Soviet Union during the 
Soviet occupation in 1949. Kolk was an investigator in the Ministry of National Security of 
Soviet Estonia, whereas Kislyiy was an inspector in the Ministry of Interior. The Estonian 
domestic courts upheld their convictions. Before the ECtHR, the defendants argued that it 
was not established by the Estonian courts that deportation had been a crime against 
humanity under international and domestic law in 1949 (as the Soviet Criminal Code in force 
at the time recognized no such crimes). The applicants questioned the reasonableness that 
they could foresee, at that time, that they were committing an offense. 
In its ruling, the ECtHR upheld the Estonian Supreme Court’s reasoning. The ECtHR 
referred to the loss of statehood as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement as an 
occupation period when Estonia was unable to fulfill its international commitments. The 
ECtHR observed that the deportation of the civilian population had been expressly 
recognized as a crime against humanity in the 1945 Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal.
32
 
Although the Nuremberg Tribunal was established for trying the major war criminals of the 
European Axis countries for the offenses they committed before or during World War II, the 
universal validity of the principles concerning crimes against humanity was subsequently 
confirmed by Resolution 95 of the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted in 1946. 
Paragraph 2 of Article 7 does not prevent the trial and punishment of a person for any act or 
omission which, at the time it was committed, was criminal according to the general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations. Furthermore, the Soviet Union had been a 
party to the 1945 Nuremberg Charter and a United Nations member when the General 
Assembly adopted Resolution 95. According to the ECtHR, therefore, it could not be argued 




 The judgment attracted criticism mainly because of the inconsistencies in the 
reasoning surrounding the Nuremberg principles. The ECtHR could have more convincingly 
argued that the applicants’ actions were connected to the execution of crimes attributable to 
the Soviet Union leaders, which fell under the Nuremberg Charter.
34
 In other words, the 
criminal nature of deportations was inferred from international criminal law, not from the fact 
that the Soviet officials and leaders had to be aware of the criminal nature of deporting 
civilians. Under the European Convention regime, for conduct to be punishable it should be 
set out as such under either national or international law. The ECtHR’s position in Kolk and 
Kislyiy reflects its position on Article 7 paragraph 2, which stipulated that at the time of its 
commission the act was criminal according to the general principle of law. In cases where 
only international rules are at play, or when they conflict with domestic criminal law, the 
requirements of accessibility and foreseeability disappear. The values upholding human 
dignity, which is a foundational legal value found at every level of the European 
constitutional legal order and is also the essence of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, tip the balance in favor of international law, to the detriment of the accessibility and 
foreseeability of criminal law. 
 This case is important for thinking about historical memory and politics because these 
historical events, and accountability for them, rest at the heart of the legal rationale for 
retrospective justice. The events took place under Soviet occupation, whose legality has been 
disputed by Estonia and Russia. As such, Kolk and Kislyiy also speaks to larger transitional 
justice issues in the FSU, because the case confirms the illegality of the Soviet occupation, 
which was not limited only to the Baltic states, but extended to other FSU republics. 
Critically, the ECtHR recognized the illegal actions of the occupying power. In so doing, this 
application of retrospective justice upheld the victims’ dignity over other rights specified in 
Article 7, as well as over the foreseeability clause. Judge Nicolas Bratza (United Kingdom), 
 13 
the presiding judge in the case, led the unanimous decision. He is known for his opinions on 
other key cases, including The Border Guards cases.
35
 In those rulings, Bratza empathized 
with the defendant and wondered whether the young soldier could have foreseen that his 
actions at the Berlin Wall would result in a later criminal conviction. Yet Bratza and the 
ECtHR were more convinced by the German Federal Court of Justice and the Federal 
Constitutional Court’s argument and application of the the Radbruch formula. In Kolk and 
Kislyiy the ECtHR referred to the “totalitarian communist regime of the Soviet Union that 
conducted large-scale and systematic actions against the Estonian population” and saw no 
reason to depart from the Estonian courts’ confirmation that the actions constituted crimes 
against humanity. Kolk and Kislyiy speaks to larger transitional justice issues that court 
redress can bring a sense of justice and closure to the oppressed (in this instance, the victims 
of the deportation and the survivors of the occupation and the repressive rule). Despite this 
important ruling, the ECtHR approach to retrospective justice is not entirely consistent, as 
will be seen in the next two cases. 
 
Latvia 
In 1993, Latvia amended its Criminal Code. As with Estonia, it collapsed crimes 
against humanity and genocide into a single article, and expanded the number of protected 
groups by adding ‘social class’ as an actionable group in Article 68 paragraph 1.
36
 General 
principles of international law were incorporated into domestic law. Further to Article 68 
paragraph 1 Latvian prosecutors prepared charges against several former Soviet security 
police officials, in connection with the deportation campaigns from 1940-1941 and in 1949.
37
  
The case of Alfons Noviks, a high-ranking officer in the secret police, presents a rare 
example of a former KGB leader being charged and convicted successfully. He was held 
responsible for committing genocide against the Latvian people, understood as the complete 
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or partial destruction of a group.
38
 The Noviks case acknowledged that common problems for 
the three Baltic states in pursuing retrospective justice were the absence of witnesses, the 
passing away of the perpetrators, and/or the lack of material evidence. For Latvia, getting 
closer to the truth was difficult also because many answers lay potentially hidden in the still 
unavailable Russian archives.
39
 The Russian leaders proved uncooperative in providing 
information to facilitate accountability for communist crimes.
40
 
The ECtHR decision in the Kononov case also highlighted a certain historical 
narrative for the Baltic states. In May 1944, Kononov and a partisan group (that is, a group of 
communists fighting against the German troops), attacked a village whose inhabitants were 
suspected of collaborating with the Nazis. Kononov, viewed as a war hero in Soviet Latvia, 
was shocked when he was prosecuted for war crimes in the 1990s. The case against him was 
highly politicized by the time it reached the ECtHR, because it forced a retelling of historical 
events that was driven less by World War II realities and more by the needs of various 
Latvian post-communist institutions to contradict the Soviet narrative and portray Latvia’s 
Soviet annexation as an unlawful occupation. In his statement, Judge Egbert Myjer (the 
Netherlands) admitted that a judge “should not normally express his private thoughts in 
relation to a judgment on which he voted. In this exceptional case, however, I think that my 
comments may at least clarify that there are many ways of thinking behind the legal wording 
in which this Strasbourg judgment has been drafted.”
41
 The remark is significant, for it 
questioned the value of retelling historical narratives about World War II, and re-identifying 
who was on the ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ side. If Kononov was ‘right’, this would challenge the 
dominant narrative about World War II and the Soviet fight against fascism as told by 
Russia.
42
 If Kononov was ‘wrong’, this would reaffirm Latvia’s alternative narrative of being 
an occupied country. The ECtHR ultimately found that Kononov’s Article 7 rights were 
violated. The Latvian government then appealed this verdict. 
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In the appeal before the Grand Chamber, the Kononov case hinged on whether the 
Nuremberg principles constituted a universal standard or if they applied to the victorious 
Allies only. While the final ruling went on to uphold the view that the Nuremberg principles 
are universal and applicable to all, it did not follow the precedent set out in Kolk and Kislyiy 
about the illegality of the Soviet occupation. The Court could have extended this precedent to 
the Latvian occupation regime, but such a move proved too much for the ECtHR. Instead the 
case established that individuals who found themselves in between two occupying forces 
were presented with impossible choices that blurred the distinction between moral and legal 
duties.
43
 As a result, the ECtHR’s observations concerning the alliances that the villagers 
could have possibly forged with either the Nazi and/or the Soviet occupiers become hollow.
44
 
In other words, the identification of who is the victim and who is the perpetrator of crimes 
against humanity becomes a complex issue. As this case shows, there were very limited 
choices to make between two competing occupiers. Is survival a war crime when an 
individual is trying to stay alive either at the frontline or by giving (under duress at times) 
information about one warring side to another? The moral ambiguities that arise when stark 
choices for survival are at play are not addressed in this definition of the crime.  
The Kononov case also illustrates competing historical politics. The Russian 
Federation exercised their right of third party intervention in the case. The Russian officials 
voiced the sentiments of the partisans, giving the impression that “with whatever methods 
one fought against Nazism, it was in any case good.”
45
 For Russia, Kononov's actions were 
justified because the Soviet takeover of the Baltic states in 1940 was not an illegal occupation 
and Russia reinforced the positive contribution that was made by individuals like Kononov in 
the fight against fascism. The multi-layered discourse centered on universal standards and the 
boundaries of concepts of war crimes and crimes against humanity; the Kononov case shows 
how Russia’s legal thinking is distinct from Europe's mainstream liberalism and its European 
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human rights machinery. Russian officials warned, “two or three more judgments concerning 
revision of the results of World War II – and countries may denounce the [European] 
Convention [of Human Rights], which will shorten the life-span of the [European] Court.”
46 
Following a 2015 law that allows constitutional law to take precedence over international 
law, including the European Convention on Human Rights, Russia is no longer bound to 
implement the rulings of the ECtHR.
47
 That decision reinforced the divide between European 
and Russian historical narratives about World War II. 
The Latvian and Estonian cases are important for transitional justice because they 
present differing positions on the same past events as retold by two different parties: the 
Baltic states and Russia. In both cases the legal provisions for imprescriptible crimes were 
expanded, but in neither case did the ECtHR really comment on this extension. In Kolk and 
Kislyiy the ECtHR examined whether crimes against humanity constituted an international 
law offense at that time of their commission. In Kononov, the ECtHR was keen to show that 
the Nuremberg principles applied to victors and losers alike, thereby supporting the 
Nuremberg standard. For historical politics, “legal procedures involving former personnel of 
the Soviet authorities meant the retelling of past events, from the Soviet forms of narratives 
to the forms congruous with the regime transition, and constituted an important part of 
history and memory politics.”
48
 More generally, “each transition from a repressive regime to 
more democratic forms of government has led to new perspectives in a country’s history. The 
power struggle between the new and old powers produces different narratives of the 
oppressor and the oppressed, about the significance of key events and persons and more 
broadly about right and wrong.”
49
 For transitional justice the fact that the ECtHR has become 
the “dispenser of transitional justice” shows that international courts can render rulings that 
validate or impose a different view of history, in support of, or in contradiction to, the 
domestic courts’ interpretation. An example of the ECtHR not validating the national courts’ 
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position is considered in the following section. 
 
Lithuania 
Like Estonia and Latvia, the general principles of international law were incorporated 
into domestic law, further to the 1992 Lithuanian Constitution. In 1992 Lithuania passed the 
Law on the Liability for Genocide against the People of Lithuania (to complement ratification 
of the 1948 Convention and the 1968 New York Convention).
50
 The 1992 law collapsed the 
crimes committed by the Soviets and the Germans against the Jews and the Lithuanians into 
one provision, a decision with broad implications for the law’s application and the 
understanding of those historical events. The law was later widened and the newer version 
served as the basis of the challenge before the ECtHR in the case discussed in this section. 
Lithuanian lawyers paid close attention to how successful their Estonian and Latvian 
counterparts were at the ECtHR, and modified their argument in the Algirdas Paleckis case.
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As such, in contrast to Estonia, Lithuania had a more coherent legal approach to tackling 
those issues. 
In Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 7. The narrow 
split vote of 9 to 8 indicated key retrospective justice issues of legal certainty and legal 
clarity. Vytautas Vasiliauskas was a Lithuanian national retroactively convicted of genocide 
under Article 99 of the Lithuanian Criminal Code of 2000.
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 The ruling concerned actions 
committed in 1953 after the annexation of Lithuania by the Soviet Union. At the center of it 
were the Lithuanian partisans, defined by the domestic courts as a political group that 
belonged to the underground resistance against the Soviet regime. Vasilauskas argued that his 
conviction violated Article 7, pointing to the Lithuanian courts’ wide interpretation of 
genocide, which included political and social groups. Most of the court justices found that the 
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conviction under Article 99 of the Lithuanian Criminal Code amounted to a violation of 
Article 7. 
Although genocide was a recognized as a crime under international law in 1953, at the 
time when the actions were committed, the ECtHR debated whether the applicant’s actions 
qualified as genocide according to the 1948 Convention. The Court held that, in this case, 
there were no convincing reasons to depart from the groups listed in the 1948 definition. 
Political groups had been intentionally excluded from the protected categories identified by 
that definition, a position supported by other international law instruments, such as the 
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes 
against Humanity of 1968, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
Statute of 1993, and the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court of 1998. 
In turn, the Lithuanian government argued that the Lithuanian partisans were ‘part’ of 
a national group (the ethnic Lithuanians), and as such were a protected group. While this 
argument did not fit with international law, it was consistent with the state narratives about 
the Soviet occupation of Lithuania. The Lithuanian authorities created a historical 
commission to research and document this view. With Estonia and Latvia expanding their 
definitions of genocide, Lithuania did so as well. In its 2003 ruling in the Vasiliauskas v. 
Lithuania case, the Lithuanian Supreme Court rejected the position that the definition of 
genocide should be understood narrowly, indicating that the state’s accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights did not deprive it of its right to interpret the 1948 Convention 
so as to permit the evaluation of the crimes committed under the Soviet occupation. But the 
ECtHR adhered to the narrow interpretation, as set out in international law, and rejected the 
‘part of a part’ approach because such an interpretation was not foreseeable to the applicant 
in 1953, and therefore could not serve as a legal basis for conviction under international law. 
Thus, the ECtHR concluded that the defendant’s Article 7 rights were violated. Moreover, in 
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the cases referring to ‘in part’ normally the distinct part of the protected groups is 
numerically large in terms of the prominence of the targeted group. In this case, Lithuanians 
partisans are considered as a distinct part of the wider ethnic Lithuanian group. 
The dissenting Judges Mark Villiger (Liechtenstein), Ann Power-Forde (Ireland), 
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque (Portugal), and Egidijus Kūris (Lithuania) argued that there had 
been no violation of Article 7. For these judges, the applicant’s conviction was foreseeable in 
1953, and the decision to restrict the application of the definition without taking the 
investigation further was equivalent to adopting an overly formalistic approach. They 
supported the Lithuanian courts’ reasoning that sought a wider approach based on an 
evaluation of historical facts. In this way, the dissenting judges indicated that Lithuanian 
partisans were not just a political group, but also a significant part of the national group of 
ethnic Lithuanians. Therefore, the killing of Lithuanian partisans was consistent with and 
could be understood as part of the broader objective to destroy ethnic Lithuanians. The judges 
were convinced of the importance of the partisans in the country’s social context, and of the 
symbolic significance of their destruction to a society that attempted to resist Soviet 
occupation. For Judge Ineta Ziemele (Latvia), the Kononov ruling provided an important 
basis upon which to find for Lithuania in the ECtHR consideration of Article 7 standards. 
The other dissenting judges, András Sajó (Hungary), Nebojša Vučinić (Montenegro) and 
Ksenija Turković (Croatia), agreed and found the majority view incorrect and misguided. 
Indeed, in Kononov, the ECtHR approved a standard requiring that offences be defined in law 
with sufficient accessibility and foreseeability.
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 Yet in Vasiliauskas, apart from the 
dissenting judges, historical politics could not find support in the ECtHR. 
The divergent majority and minority positions adopted by the judges reveal the 
divisions even within the ECtHR in defining genocide. The Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania case 
could result in further challenges under Article 7 of the European Convention of Human 
 20 
Rights. Case commentators worry that individuals convicted of genocide by the International 
Criminal Court (or the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia) may be tempted to 
challenge their conviction before the ECtHR, relying on Article 7 of the European 
Convention in holding the state into account for not protecting them properly from the 
enlarged, domestic interpretation of genocide.
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 All court judges agreed on the list of 
protected groups included in the 1948 Convention, but they disagreed on identifying as 
genocidal the targeting of a part of a part. 
In the Stanislovas Drėlingas case from April 2016, the Lithuanian Supreme Court 
ignored the genocide judgment the ECtHR handed down in the Vasiliauskas case. Drėlingas 
was convicted for his participation in the capture of Lithuanian partisans, in a plan that was 
coordinated by the Soviet secret services. Drėlingas was neither the leader of the plan, nor 
involved in the torture of those captured. He was, however, convicted for genocide of a 
national-ethno-political group. In its verdict, the Lithuanian Supreme Court only superficially 
referred to the Vasiliauskas case, and news media outlets failed to note that the ruling 
contradicted the ECtHR. In the end, Drėlingas’s six-year prison sentence was reduced to six-
months’ imprisonment.
55
 Victims and survivors of the Soviet occupation in Lithuania might 
not be satisfied with the ECtHR decision, but they will most likely applaud the Lithuanian 
Supreme Court ruling. The Supreme Court, however, is rendering rulings that do not conform 
to ECtHR decisions, and are arguably unconstitutional. Supporters of retrospective justice 
will question the inconsistencies that have opened up domestically and internationally as a 
result of these Lithuanian cases. 
 
Conclusion 
In the Baltic states, transitional justice has included important methods of 
accountability associated with court trials and verdicts. These methods are not always seen as 
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overt and direct forms of transitional justice, but this chapter demonstrated that these cases 
led to the (re)construction of historical narratives about the Soviet past. In this way, both the 
domestic court verdicts and their challenges before the ECtHR explored retrospective justice 
questions related to actions carried out by the Soviet occupying powers in the Baltics. Court 
rulings validated the Baltic states’ narratives with respect to the framing of the offenses as 
crimes against humanity and/or genocide. The verdicts are documents that reflect a certain 
understanding of the history of the region, and thus function as a type of transitional justice. 
Note that the ECtHR judges and the domestic courts in the Baltic states upheld a wide 
diversity of opinions on whether acts perpetrated during Soviet times in the Baltic states can 
be considered as crimes punishable after 1991. The salient areas of contestation were 
historical narratives, as put forth by the Baltics and by the Russians, and whether the crimes 
fell under the statutes of limitations. The Baltic retelling of the past was upheld by the 
ECtHR, but not without some debate about historical contexts, as seen in the Kononov case, 
before the Chamber and Grand Chamber (see Table 1). In this case, the dominant (Western) 
European historical narrative, and the Russian position towards its country’s contribution in 
the fight against fascism, was challenged. In fact, Kolk and Kislyiy laid the groundwork for 
the ECtHR to recognize the illegality of the Soviet occupation of Latvia. It did not do so, but 
the ECtHR held that the Nuremberg principles apply equally to the Allies and Axis powers 
alike. 
Insert Table 1 around here 
The differences arise in the way that genocide is defined, as seen in Vasiliauskas. 
There are several issues at stake. One, taken from Vasiliauskas, is whether the Lithuanian 
definition of genocide that includes national political groups will lead to a change on the part 
of the ECtHR in its approach to genocide. At present this is a minority view. If not, states 
(such as Lithuania) will go on to ignore the ECtHR rulings. Without clarity on the part of the 
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ECtHR, a state’s move to expand a definition of a crime (such as genocide) will mean 
opening itself up to challenges from those individuals convicted of genocide. This becomes a 
transitional justice issue for the victims and survivors of a repressive regime, who are hoping 
for accountability and some sort of validation of their human dignity through the court’s 
(both, or either, domestic and international courts) endorsement of their suffering. All three 
cases concerned retrospective justice, and debated the definition of war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide. While the state narratives converged in their position on 
crimes committed during the Soviet occupation, the ECtHR revealed a less consistent 
approach in its validation of domestic legal provisions and state historical narratives. While 
the ECtHR did not confirm the petition (in Vasiliauskas), the split vote demonstrated a 
possible change in the way that international courts will interpret crimes. Moreover, the three 
cases involved the ECtHR as the European forum in which these state narratives were 
challenged and debated. 
I argue that through these and other cases, the ECtHR is shaping legal and political 
developments in the FSU. These three cases demonstrate that the ECtHR has become an 
important “dispenser of transitional justice,” and a critical European forum in which various 
versions of history prevail at different times. However, the diversity of the ECtHR judges and 
differences in court practices mean that consistency across cases will not always prevail. 
Importantly, a court composed of 47 judges will mean differences in approach to the 
interpretation of the law and in the understanding of peculiar state histories. All three cases 
saw important contributions from judges representing either former communist states or the 
FSU, such as Judges Ziemele and Kūris whose dissent strongly criticized a majority position 
that they saw as narrow, shortsighted, and unable to embrace a wider definition of genocide. 
The Dutch ECtHR Judge, Egbert Myjer, cannot be ignored. His contribution reflected and 
supported the Russian position on the Allies’ critical role in fighting fascism during World 
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War II. This view, as shown in this chapter, is being revised, with the help of the ECtHR. In 
sum, the decisions depended on the judges’ understanding of past crimes, and whether the 
action qualified as crimes according to domestic and international law. 
For the FSU and transitional justice, this points to the selective manner in which some 
histories are repressed and other histories are validated, highlighting the instrumental use of 
the past to forge a new national narrative through prosecutorial action. Court petitions and 
cases challenge narratives underscoring the Soviet heroism against fascism, and by doing so, 
in the view of the Russian officials, they distort World War II reality. In this way, the Baltic 
cases are not just about the Baltics. These cases reverberate through other FSU states, in 
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